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The Relative Costs of Incorporating Trade Usage into
Domestic versus International Sales Contracts:
Comments on Clayton Gillette, Institutional Design and
International Usages under the CISG
Avery Wiener Katz*
Clayton Gillette's paper on the use of trade usage in reported disputes
arising under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG") presents a challenge to recent scholarly critiques of
modern contractual interpretation.' As Gillette explains, much recent writing by
economically influenced US scholars in contracts and commercial law has argued
in favor of more formalistic methods of interpretation, and against the
overwhelming trend of the last half of the twentieth century: a trend toward a
more contextual interpretative approach that takes into account a variety of
evidence, including the business purpose of the transaction, the customs and
practices of the market in which the parties transact, the history of the parties'
dealings, and even the parties' pre- and post-contractual communications.2 These
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. E-mail: avkatz@law.columbia.edu. I am
grateful for helpful discussions with Clayton Gillette and Lisa Bernstein, and with other
participants in the Symposium, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant, The
University of Chicago Law School (Oct 16-17, 2003).
1 Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages
under the CISG, 5 ChiJ Intl L 157 (2004).
2 Id. The leading exponents of this position include Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts:
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judidal Strategies, 21 J Legal Studies 271 (1992); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court. Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U Pa L Rev 1765 (1996); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in Peter Newman, ed, 2 New
Palgrave Dictionagy of Economics and the Law 277 (Palgrave Macmillan 1998); Lisa Bernstein, The
Quesionable Empirical Basis ofArlide 2s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U Chi L Rev 710
(1999); Richard A. Epstein, Confusion about Custom: Disentangling Informal Custom from Standard
Contractual Prvisions, 66 U Chi L Rev 821 (1999); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformiy Norm in
Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in Jody S. Kraus and
Steven D. Walt, eds, The Jurisprudential Foundalions of Cor orate and Commercial Law 149 (Cambridge
2000); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw U L Rev 847 (2000),
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Se#Enforing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum L Rev 1641 (2003); Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J 541
(2003).
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critiques have extended even to the interpretative use of trade usage, which has
long been regarded as an especially reliable source of information about the
parties' intentions and which enjoys a privileged status in US domestic sales
cases decided under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").3
Gillette argues, based on a survey of international case law, that Article 9(2)
of the CISG, which directs tribunals to incorporate international trade usage into
private contracts governed by the Convention unless the parties agree otherwise,
works well in practice and has not led to the adverse consequences of which
formalist critics have warned. This Comment expands upon Gillette's argument
to provide a more robust account of when substantive interpretative doctrines
such as trade usage might be desirable, and why such doctrines appear to be
especially useful in the transnational setting of the CISG. In my view, Gillette's
account is incomplete because it does not provide an explanation of why
international tribunals have not fallen prey to the temptations of more
substantive interpretation in the way that US domestic courts have, and because
it focuses primarily on the costs of interpretative uncertainty to the exclusion of
a fuller list of costs and benefits relevant to the choice of interpretative regime.
Taking this list of considerations into account renders more comprehensible the
widespread use of trade usage and similar contextual standards in the
transnational setting, and reinforces Gillette's conclusions regarding trade
usage's commercial functionality.
I. THE DEBATE OVER FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE
INTERPRETATION
The basic critique made by contemporary formalist scholars in the fields of
contracts and commercial law is that trade usage, even when it exists, is
considerably more complex, subtle, and heterogeneous than mainstream
scholars and commentators have appreciated. The formalists argue that much
regularly observed behavior reflects not compliance with what the parties regard
as customary legal obligation, but rather a conscious departure from those
obligations for purposes of business goodwill or an implicit settlement of a
potential contractual dispute. Generalist courts deciding disputed cases ex post,
on this view, are unlikely to be able to observe and understand this complex
environment with the accuracy that is needed for their interventions to be
helpful. Additionally, these critics have argued that the value of commercial
certainty and the need to maintain a strict separation between legal obligations
3 Under UCC §§ 1-201(3) and 1-205, trade usage (along with course of dealing and course of
performance) supplements and gives meaning to the particular terms of every agreement
governed by the Code; and under UCC § 2-202, the same sources of evidence are always available,
in contrast to parol evidence, to explain or supplement the agreement, even if the agreement
appears clear on its face. UCC §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-202 (ALl 2002).
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and social regularities conferred as a matter of grace are so great as to foreclose
inquiry into trade usage even where the adjudicators are themselves experienced
trade participants.4
The growing influence of this formalist thesis in the US scholarly literature
stands in sharp contrast to the view of most international commercial lawyers
and scholars, who are accustomed to a legal regime in which courts and
arbitrators routinely consider contextual factors, such as trade usage, and apply
open-textured legal standards, such as good faith, when rendering their
decisions. As Gillette observes, by the new formalists' logic, international
commerce presents a particularly inapposite arena for substantive interpretation.
The ability of generalist arbitrators and decentralized national courts usefully to
apply contextual standards is likely to be substantially diminished in an
environment characterized by greater heterogeneity among traders, relative
infrequency of repeat dealings, and linguistic, cultural, and geographic distances
that make it more difficult for the adjudicators-or indeed, the traders
themselves-to observe and communicate about business practice.
Nonetheless, the CISG, an international treaty drafted with the
participation of business advisory groups and adopted with the consent of a
heterogeneous set of national actors, incorporates a variety of contextual legal
standards that depend on ex post substantive interpretation for their content.
These include not just the trade usage provision of Article 9(2), but also
provisions that, inter alia, prescribe a reasonableness test for all interpretative
questions; allow contractual liability to be imposed without any formal writing
requirement; direct tribunals to interpret the entire Convention in light of
unspecified standards of good faith in international trade; indicate that questions
not expressly settled in the CISG should be settled by reference to the general
principles on which it is based; and direct tribunals to consider all relevant
evidence in interpreting the parties' intentions and expectations, including even
communications that would be barred as parol evidence under common law
systems.5 Furthermore, to my knowledge, there is no apparent pattern of
attempts by contracting parties to opt out of Article 9(2)'s trade usage provision,
even though such opt-out clauses are explicitly authorized by Article 6, and even
4 This last argument is particularly associated with the work of Lisa Bernstein. See Bernstein, 66 U
Chi L Rev at 710 (cited in note 2); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Coton Industry.
Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001).
5 See CISG Article 7(1) (interpretation in light of good faith), Article 8(2) (reasonableness standard
for interpretation), Article 7(2) (questions not expressly settled in the CISG to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based), Article 8(3) (due consideration to be
given to all relevant circumstances including pre-contractual negotiations), and Article 11 (no
formal requirements for proving or evidencing contracts, including a writing; the treaty elsewhere
provides, though, exceptions for contracts involving countries that expressly entered reservations
to this Article at the time they ratified the CISG). United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 1489 UN Treaty Ser 58, 61 (1988) (hereinafter CISG).
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though parties regularly include in their contracts merger and entire-agreement
clauses that exclude pre-contractual communications from the interpretative
process.
If the formalist critics are right, then something is seriously wrong with
international commercial law practice; and, conversely, if the international
commercial law elites are right, something is wrong with the formalist critique.
With this dichotomy as background, Gillette pronounces the CISG's more
substantive approach to trade usage to be a success, which he attributes to three
main factors. First, few cases are litigated, so the chances are low that the costs
of substantive inquiry will actually be incurred ex post. Second, the same features
of international trade that make it difficult to determine trade usages in the first
place also imply that most cognizable usages will be generated by mercantile
associations, such as the ICC, that have the ability and incentive to disseminate
efficient usages that can be applied in a straightforward fashion. And third, the
courts and arbitrators that are called upon to apply trade usage under Article 9(2)
have chosen to be restrained in doing so, perhaps because of their understanding
of the needs of international commerce, and perhaps in deference to the textual
requirement of Article 9(2) that limits consideration to trade usages that have an
international character.
My own resolution of the apparent conflict between the scholarly critique
and transnational practice accords more or less with Gillette's, but for a
somewhat different set of reasons. In particular, Gillette's account of the
incentives of courts and arbitrators in international commercial disputes is
undeveloped, and so gives little reason for confidence that those tribunals will
continue to be restrained in their use of contextual evidence in the future when
applying different doctrinal provisions such as good faith and course of dealing.
I do agree with Gillette that incorporating trade usage and using other contextual
standards is likely to be less costly and more sensible in the CISG setting than in
the UCC setting out of which the formalist critique originally arose, but would
argue that this is the case because of a more systematic set of considerations
than he provides.
As I have explained elsewhere, the optimal choice between form and
substance in contract interpretation depends on a tradeoff among a variety of
diverse planning and incentive considerations.6 These considerations include:
6 Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Intepretation, 104 Colum L Rev
496 (2004). My article is hardly the first to argue against the formalist critique on economic
grounds, but it does offer a more thorough survey Qf relevant economic considerations than
previous work. For other economically influenced scholars taking a skeptical position on
interpretative formalism, see Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J
Legal Studies 377 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Eidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Pfinciples of ContractualInteopretation, 146 U Pa L Rev 533 (1998); and Jody S. Kraus and Steven D.
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the costs of writing more detailed contracts ex ante, the costs of rent-seeking
(both ex ante in contractual negotiations and ex post once a dispute has arisen),
the principal parties' ability to provide their legal and business agents with
proper incentives to enter into contracts on efficient terms, the parties' attitudes
toward risk and the distribution of information among potential tribunals, the
need to make specific investments whose value depends on a particular
contractual interpretation, and the need to induce complementary investments
by third parties who may have differential access to the formal and substantive
aspects of the principal parties' agreement. As a result, the formalist argument
against substantive interpretation does not hold generally, but holds only in
those cases where the interplay of these considerations renders the benefits of
formality greater on balance than its costs. It is for this reason that I recommend
that the choice between formal and substantive modes of interpretation be left
to the contracting parties themselves, who are likely to be in a much better
position to evaluate these considerations than are courts, legislatures, or
diplomats negotiating international treaties.
Thus, when Gillette states that incorporation of trade usage makes sense
where third-party tribunals can identify relevant usages and verify compliance
with them at reasonable cost and accuracy, he focuses only on one of these
considerations For his conclusion to be correct, his generalization needs to be
understood in relative, or other-things-being-equal, terms-that is, that
incorporating trade usage makes sense when tribunals can apply it at relatively
reasonable cost and with relative accuracy, compared with all the other costs of
using trade usage in the interpretative process.
II. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF SUBSTANTIVE
INTERPRETATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Starting from this more systematic framework for balancing the costs and
benefits of formality, one can identify a more robust set of explanations that
describe why sophisticated commercial parties engaging in international
transactions are willing to tolerate more substantive methods of interpretation in
general and freer use of trade usage evidence in particular. These explanations
do not depend on the presumed grace or good judgment of arbitrators or
judges-such a presumption might happen to be warranted in practice but
surely is not in principle-nor on the peculiarities of the process by which
international trade usage is developed. Rather, they stem from the different
relative costs and benefits of dispute resolution and contract writing that obtain
in the international setting.
Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in Kraus and Walt, eds, The Jurisprudenial Foundations of
Corporate and CommerialLaw 193 (cited in note 2).
Gillette, 5 ChiJ Ind L at 164 (cited in note 1).
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Specifically, there are at least four overlapping reasons why the cost of
considering trade usage and other contextual evidence will be lower in
international sales transactions than in the US domestic setting out of which the
new formalist scholarship has arisen. These are: first, a greater leeway for the
parties to contract out of tribunals and usages that are likely to apply most
inefficiently to their particular situation; second, the simpler and cheaper
procedures available in international compared to US domestic litigation; third,
the routine use of commercial letters of credit for international payment; and
fourth, the relative unimportance of variable as opposed to fixed costs in
international dispute resolution.
A. FREEDOM TO CHOOSE GOVERNING LAW AND
VENUE FOR LITIGATION
In the arena of international sales contracts, it is relatively easy for the
parties to opt out of substantive interpretative regimes if they wish, either
through explicit choice of governing law, or through forum clauses that will
ensure that any dispute is heard by a tribunal that is more responsive to their
business concerns. The rules and culture of international private law have long
taken a liberal attitude toward the parties' contractual choice of applicable law;
and the CISG follows in this tradition, specifically authorizing parties in Article 6
to exclude the application of the entire convention from their contract, or, less
drastically, to derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions, including
the trade usage provision of Article 9(2).'
In contrast, while it is theoretically possible to exclude particular trade
usages from sales contracts under UCC 55 1-205 and 2-208, in practice it is often
difficult for contracting parties to tell when and whether they have effectively
done so. Under these provisions, courts are directed to construe express
contractual terms as consistent with trade usages, courses of dealing, and courses
of performance wherever possible, and to exclude the application of these
There are some minor limitations on this power to derogate from the individual articles of the
CISG. The parties may exclude the application of the convention or, subject to Article 12,
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. Specifically, where one of the parties to
the contract has its place of business in a state that has made a reservation under Article 96
relating to the question of whether a contract must be formally evidenced by a writing in order to
be enforceable, the parties may not agree to dispense with the writing requirement that their
home state has retained; in addition, the parties cannot derogate from the public international law
provisions of Articles 89-101, as these provisions cover issues relevant to contracting states rather
than private parties.
Additionally, the question has arisen in case law whether parties wishing to opt out of the
CISG must do so explicitly or may do so implicitly. It has been generally held, however, that a
clause which states that "this contract is governed by the laws of state X," where state X has
joined the CISG, does not suffice to exclude the CISG's applicability, unless the clause refers
specifically to state X's domestic law only.
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supposed background norms only when they cannot reasonably be construed as
consistent with express terms. Following the apparent intention of the statutory
drafters, US courts have bent over backwards to find consistency between
express terms and trade usage. For instance, they have denied summary
judgment in cases where a litigant claimed that trade usages belied apparently
clear contractual clauses providing for fixed quantity or fixed price terms.9
Furthermore, UCC Article 2 offers no authorized way generally to exclude trade
usages and courses of dealings in the manner of CISG Article 6; if the parties
wish to exclude usages, they must do so explicitly and by specific reference,
which is obviously much more costly and cumbersome.
Similarly, parties' ability to opt out of substantive interpretation regimes
through choice of law and forum selection clauses is more limited in US
domestic contracts than in the international arena. In addition to the more
liberal tradition of freedom of contract that usually obtains in transnational
cases, sales contracts in the domestic sales context are governed by a uniform
statute in force in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Thus, if US parties
want to have their dispute heard by a court, they cannot avoid the application of
the UCC in the way that transnational litigants can opt into a more formal
regime by providing for their contract to be interpreted under the laws of
England and enforced by a tribunal sitting in London.
This greater freedom of contract in the international setting both provides
a safety valve for those parties who would be most disadvantaged by a
substantive interpretative regime and gives international tribunals a competitive
incentive to keep their interpretative inquiries within limits if they want to enjoy
continued business. For both reasons, it is less costly, other things being equal,
for international parties to operate under a trade usage regime than it would be
in the US domestic setting.
B. LOWER PROCEDURAL COSTS IN CONSIDERING
CONTEXT EVIDENCE
In addition to the possibility of opting into more formal substantive legal
rules, transnational commercial litigation also gives the parties access to
institutional proceedings that are generally less complicated and less costly than
US legal forums. Commercial litigation under UCC Article 2 is governed by the
standard set of American civil procedures, which include extensive pretrial
9 See Columbia Nitrogen Corp v Royster Co, 451 F2d 3, 8-11 (4th Cir 1971) (course of dealing and
usage of trade admitted into evidence to show that express quantity terms in written contract were
actually buyers' options); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co v Shell Oil Co, 664 F2d 772, 805 (9th Cir 1981)
(trade usage and course of dealing admitted into evidence to show that price was to be measured
at time of contract despite express term fixing price as of delivery). See also cases discussed in
Scott, The Uniformiy Norm in Commerial Law at 149 (cited in note 2).
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discovery and the constitutional right to a jury. Whatever their other merits,
these procedures raise the cost of litigation by providing greater opportunity to
develop and introduce evidence and by diminishing the likelihood that the case
can be resolved on the pleadings or at summary judgment. They also increase
the uncertainty of the outcome by committing critical factual determinations to
an amateur tribunal that lacks both commercial and legal experience. For both
reasons, US procedures make the incremental costs of substantive interpretation
especially large.
In international litigation conducted outside United States courts, in
contrast, the scope for investigating contextual matters is comparatively limited;
and the relatively high cost of transporting witnesses or experts makes in-person
testimony relatively infrequent, so that judgment can often be rendered based on
written submissions. Under such circumstances, allowing trade usage and similar
contextual evidence to be admitted may increase litigation costs by a relatively
small amount. Additionally, since the agent charged with the task of interpreting
the agreement will usually have extensive legal expertise (and in the arbitral
setting, commercial expertise as well), the potential variance among tribunals in
assessing such evidence, as well as its associated transaction costs of risk-bearing
and settlement negotiations, will also be relatively low.
C. LETTERS OF CREDIT AS A BACKUP ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM
In many, if not most, international sales cases, the threat of going to court
is not the parties' primary enforcement device. This is because the parties
typically arrange for payment through the device of a commercial letter of credit
("CLC"), under which a buyer of goods engages an issuing bank to promise to
pay the seller upon presentation of documents showing that the goods have
been shipped. In addition to providing a medium for transmission of funds, the
CLC also affords an alternate, inexpensive, and formal method of dispute
resolution because, given the costs of bringing a lawsuit in a distant and possibly
inhospitable location, the seller's ability to obtain payment will often determine
the outcome of any dispute. And, in contrast to the relatively contextual legal
standards provided by the CISG, the law governing letters of credit is quite
formalistic. According to the basic principle of letter-of-credit law (denoted the
"independence principle" by scholars in the field), a beneficiary's rights against
an issuing bank depend only on its compliance with the documentary conditions
of the letter under which it seeks payment. The beneficiary does not otherwise
have to prove its entitlement to payment, and the issuer does not have to (and in
general is not allowed to) investigate the substance of the underlying transaction
before paying. The formal nature of letter-of-credit law thus lowers the effective
costs of substantive interpretation in cases going to trial or arbitration. Judges
and arbiters in international disputes can thus better afford to apply substantive
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standards of interpretation because they know that the letter-of-credit device is
operating as a backup for them, perhaps in the same way that trade association
arbitrators in the US can afford to operate in a formalistic way because non-legal
sanctions applied by the relevant commercial community are available to enforce
the more substantive aspects of parties' obligations."
D. HIGH FIXED COST OF LITIGATION
Finally, whatever the ex post costs of considering trade usage, parties will
be more willing to bear them in international settings because they are relatively
small compared to the fixed cost of litigating in the first place. Pursuing a
dispute internationally is more costly than pursuing one domestically, other
things being equal, because of the need to transport lawyers, witnesses, and
evidence to a distant location for litigation, the need to hire arbitrators or local
counsel, and the difficulty of collecting any monetary award in a foreign
jurisdiction. As indicated previously, these high costs explain why low-cost
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as letters of credit and arbitration, are
popular in the international setting and why litigation is relatively rare.
Nonetheless, in some cases it is unfortunately necessary to litigate and to spend
the associated resources in doing so. Because many of these expenditures are
fixed in amount and do not depend on the intensity of litigation, however, the
incremental cost of considering additional evidence, given that there is already
going to be litigation, is relatively low in comparison. More generally, it makes
sense to litigate more intensively in litigation that is characterized by higher
stakes or higher overhead costs, and in the international setting it is these cases
that are typically brought before arbitrators or courts.1'
10 See generally Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 1732-33, 1745 (cited in note 4) (stating both that trade
arbitrators apply a formalistic approach to interpretative questions and that non-legal sanctions,
not arbitral awards, actually provide the main incentive to keep one's commercial commitments).
Note also that the mechanism that Bernstein identified as backing up the incentive to comply
with trade usage-reputation and the resultant threat of losing repeat or referral business-is
substantially weakened in the international setting where communication networks are more
diffuse and repeat dealing is less common.
11 This implication is a special case of what Chicago-trained economists know as the Alchian-Allen
theorem, which holds that when transportation costs are fixed, market forces will lead to goods of
relatively high quality trading across distances and goods of relatively low quality trading near
home, because fixed transportation costs make the relative price of quality higher near the source
than farther away. See Thomas E. Borcherding and Eugene Silberberg, Shipping the Good Apples
Out: The Achian and Allen Theorem Reconsidered, 86 J Pol Econ 131 (1978) (analyzing the argument
formally and concluding that it is a useful generalization, if not a logical implication of economic
theory); Eric P. Bertonazzi, Michael T. Maloney, and Robert McCormick, Some Evidence on the
Alchian and Allen Theorem: The Third Law of Demand?, 31 Econ Inquiry 383 (1993) (presenting
empirical evidence confirming the generalization); David Hummels and Alexandre Skiba, Shpping
the Good Apples Out? An Empirical Confirmation of the Alchian-Allen Conjecture (Nad Bureau of Econ
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III. CONCLUSION
Gillette is correct both when he argues that the value of incorporating
trade usage into contractual interpretation depends on the business and
institutional context, and when he argues that the international context is
different in this regard in the setting of international sales transactions.
Understanding why the international context is different, however, requires
considerable attention to the details of that context. Indeed, because of the
difficulties of generalizing about the costs and benefits of formality, scholars
should be more restrained about recommending formal regimes of
interpretation beyond their ability to be certain that the resulting net benefits are
really positive. A more defensible approach would be to advocate making it
easier for contracting parties to choose an interpretative regime for themselves;
and this is, in fact, what the CISG does for them in most respects.
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